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The concept of an undertaking is central both to the question of whether the EU 
competition law rules apply to the conduct of an entity and, if so, which of those rules 
apply. Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) 
deals with the joint conduct of two or more undertakings - agreements and concerted 
practices between undertakings and decisions by associations of undertakings
1
 which 
have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, 
Article 102 focuses on single-firm conduct
2
 - prohibiting an undertaking which holds 
a dominant position in the EU or a substantial part of it from committing an abuse of 
that dominant position, whilst the EU Merger Regulation (“EUMR”)3 deals with 
changes to the structure of competition resulting from corporate reorganisations 
 
*
  Alison Jones is a Professor of Law at King’s College London. The author would like to thank 
Joanna Goyder and Brenda Sufrin for their comments on a previous draft of this article. This 
article is based on a chapter, “Drawing the boundary between joint and unilateral conduct: Parent-
Subsidiary Relationships and Joint Ventures”, published in A Ezrachi (ed) International Research 
Handbook of Competition Law (Edward Elgar, 2012) and permission has been granted to quote 
from this chapter. 
1
  The expressions are interpreted distinctly and expansively “to catch forms of collusion having the 
same nature which are distinguishable from each other only by their intensity and the forms in 
which they manifest themselves”, Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van 
de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529, para 23. Although its provisions are 
interpreted broadly to prevent avoidance of the rules, it is not designed to extend to wholly 
unilateral conduct of a single undertaking. 
2
  The rules may, however, reach situations where a dominant firm incorporates exclusionary 
contractual restraints in its contracts with third parties. 
3
  Regulation 139/2004 [2004] OJ L 24/1. This article does not deal with the related question of 
whether the concept of undertaking used in Arts 101, 102 and the EUMR is the same as the 
concept used in the state aid provisions or, more broadly, in other areas of the TFEU. 
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between undertakings. Like many other competition law systems, Articles 101 and 
102 thus draw a fundamental distinction between concerted and independent action, 
treating concerted, or coordinated, conduct between undertakings
4
 more sceptically, 
and viewing it as more “inherently fraught with antitrust risk”,5 than unilateral 
conduct. In contrast, fewer constraints are imposed on the internal business decisions 
of a single firm
6
 - Article 102 applies only to the unilateral conduct of an undertaking 
if it is dominant and if that conduct is “abusive”.  
 Despite the centrality of the concept of an “undertaking” to the scope of, and 
relationship between, the EU competition law provisions the term is not defined in the 
Treaty. Rather the meaning of the term has been left for elucidation in the case-law. It 
is now trite law that a functional approach is taken to the concept of an undertaking
7
 
and that it encompasses any entity (including individuals, legal persons such as 
companies and partnerships, State and public bodies) engaged in economic activity,
8
 
regardless of its legal personality or status or the way in which it is financed.
9
 Further, 
it has also been long accepted that the term undertaking is not necessarily 
synonymous with natural or legal personality
10
 but denotes “an economic unit for the 
purpose of the subject-matter of the agreement in question even if in law that 
 
4
  Copperweld Corporation v Independence Tube Corporation 467 US 752, 769 (1984) (“In any 
conspiracy, two or more entities that previously pursued their own interests separately are 
combining to act as one for their common benefit ... Of course, such merging of resources may 
well lead to efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their anticompetitive potential is sufficient to 
warrant scrutiny even in the absence of incipient monopoly”). 
5
  ibid 768. 
6
  American Needle, Inc v National Football League 130 SCt 2201, 2209 fn 2 (2010) ( “if every 
unilateral action that restrained trade were subject to antitrust scrutiny, the courts would be forced 
to judge almost every internal business decision). Overregulation of unilateral conduct might 
threaten the competitive enthusiasm that the antitrust laws seek to promote”). 
7
  See e.g., Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-8089, 
Jacobs AG, para 72 and Case C-49/07, Motosykletistiki Omospondia Ellados NPID (MOTOE) v 
Elliniko Dimosio [2008] ECR I-4863, para 25. 
8
  Consisting of the offering of goods and services on a given market.  
9
  Case C-41/90, Höfner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21; Case T-513/93, 
Consiglio Nazionale degli Spedizionieri Doganali v Commission [2000] ECR II-1807, para 36. 
Undertakings are thus the economic actors to which Articles 101 and Article 102 apply. 
10
  Pre-insulated Pipe Cartel [1999] OJ L24/1, para 154 (“The subject of the competition rules in the 
Treaty is the “undertaking`, a concept not necessarily identical with the notion of corporate legal 
personality in national commercial company or fiscal law”). 
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economic unit consists of several persons, natural of legal.”11 It is therefore a 
“complex concept involving human and physical components joined in the pursuit of 
a single economic activity …”.12  
These definitions and characteristics immediately indicate that it may not 
always be easy to identify an undertaking and its boundaries and, consequently, 
whether one, or more, undertaking exists and whether it/they are acting unilaterally or 
jointly for the purposes of the competition law rules.
13
 For example, a company or 
partnership may be made up of individuals capable of competing with one another, a 
principal and an agent or members of the same corporate group (a parent and its 
subsidiaries) may constitute separate legal entities but the question of whether they 
each constitute distinct undertakings or form part of the same economic unit is critical 
to the issue of whether or not Article 101 applies to agreements between them. 
Similarly a joint venture (“JV”),14 created structurally as a separate entity to its 
parents, could be viewed as a single economic unit together with its parents or as a 
separate undertaking which operates in collaboration with its parents.
15
 If the JV and 
its parents are viewed as a single economic actor its unilateral actions will infringe EU 
competition law only if it is dominant and it commits an abuse. Further, arrangements 
 
11
  Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v Compact del Dott Ing Mario Andreoli & C Sas 
[1984] ECR 2999, para 11; Case C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel v Commission [2009] ECR I-8237, para 
55. This suggests that the assessment must be made in the context of the specific agreement 
concluded so that the same entity might be considered to be acting unilaterally or jointly depending 
on the nature of the agreement. See also Case C-217/05, Confederación Española de Empresarios 
de Estaciones de Servicio v Compañia Española de Petróleos SA [2006] ECR I-11987 and nn 26, 
86 and accompanying text. 
12
  Case T-6/89, Enichem v Commission [1991] ECR II-1623, paras 233-235. 
13
  The relationship between the “economic activity” and “economic unit” requirements is also not 
clear. In particular, it is unclear whether an entity engaged in economic activity is the critical factor 
to determining the scope of the economic unit (see e.g., the discussion of employment and agency 
relationships below) or whether an entity engaged in economic activity may not constitute an 
undertaking if it forms part of a larger economic unit.  
14
  The term JV can be used to describe a wide spectrum of commercial arrangements between firms. 
In competition law, it is frequently used to describe an entity which (i) constitutes a separate 
business entity, and (ii) is jointly controlled by at least two parents.  
15
  The JV may be viewed both as “an economic actor in its own right and a collaboration of its 
participants”, G Werden, “Antitrust Analysis of Joint ventures: An Overview” (1998) 66 Antitrust 
LJ 701. See also A Devlin and M Jacobs, ‘Joint-Venture Analysis After American Needle’ (2011) 
7(3) J Competition L & Economics 543, 545 (this point may be particularly acute in the context of 
a sports league or sports association, for example, where each team forming part of the league or 
association may be autonomous and compete with each other both on and off the field, but which 
may by itself be a meaningless entity “a person without a purpose” and dependent “for its 
existence and profitability … upon the success of the league”). 
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between the JV and its parents may constitute intra-undertaking agreements falling 
outside the scope of Article 101(1). If, in contrast, the JV is viewed as a collaboration 
of its parents, much of its conduct, including its purchasing, pricing and output 
decisions (as well as its contractual arrangements with its parents (and between the 
parents)), will be open to examination and analysed rigorously as joint conduct under 
Article 101. 
An important challenge for the EU competition law system is, therefore, to 
ensure that the parameters of an undertaking are clearly defined so that an 
unequivocal line can be drawn between concerted conduct falling within the scope of 
Article 101 and unilateral conduct falling outside of it. In drawing such boundaries it 
is critical that sight is not lost of this important consequence – that joint conduct of 
entities within the economic unit is treated as unilateral and so is per se legal under 
Article 101. The doctrine thus needs to be realistically and carefully confined so as to 
ensure that potentially anti-competitive arrangements between firms do not escape 
scrutiny under the competition law rules. The discussion in this paper indicates that, 
despite its significance, the question of how broadly the boundaries of an economic 
unit and a single undertaking extend is not clearly resolved in EU competition law. 
Rather, the interpretation given to the concept has been developed incrementally in 
two main strands of jurisprudence which are arguably underpinned by different policy 
objectives - one dealing with the “substantive reach” of Article 101 and the question 
of whether the conduct of two or more entities is characterized as joint or unilateral 
and the other dealing with the question of whether liability for a competition law 
infringement committed by one entity can be imposed on, or attributed to, another 
entity within the corporate group/economic unit (“attribution of liability” cases). Not 
only may this fact have led to the interpretation of the concept being developed in one 
line of cases without full regard being taken for the consequences in the other, but it 
may have resulted in an over-expansive interpretation being adopted and some 
inconsistencies and conflicts arising, making a coherent answer to the question of 
what is an undertaking?, hard to discern.  
Although a number of commentators have recently been railing against the 
economic unit being used as a broad mechanism for attributing liability for 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2131740 
  
infringements by one entity to another within the same undertaking,
16
 only a few have 
sought to analyse the question of what constitutes an economic unit, and its relevance 
to all the EU competition law rules, more generally.
17
 This article also seeks to 
determine the boundaries of an undertaking in EU competition law more broadly, 
taking account of some important recent developments in the case-law.  
It commences in Part B by examining some of the core cases which establish 
how the notion of an undertaking is applied to natural persons, legal persons, and 
groups of persons (such as principal and agent, parent and subsidiaries and parents 
and JV) and seeks to clarify the principles and policy underpinning and influencing 
them. In Part C the implications of the case-law are assessed and it is considered both 
whether the cases support the view that there is a single concept of an undertaking 
which applies throughout EU competition law and/or whether such an approach is 
desirable. In the light of this and, in particular the policy objectives underpinning the 
economic unit doctrine, Part D discusses whether there is a need for a more holistic 
approach to be taken to the concept of an undertaking, requiring some reconsideration 
of, and retrenchment in, the case-law. 
B. IDENTIFYING AN ECONOMIC UNIT AND ITS BOUNDARIES 
1.  Natural persons, legal persons and groups of persons 
It is well-established that an undertaking may range from a single individual to two or 
more companies within a corporate group, i.e., it may comprise natural persons, legal 
 
16
  See e.g., J Joshua, Y Botteman and L Atlee, “‘You Can’t Beat the Percentage’- The Parental 
Liability Presumption in EU Cartel Enforcement’ in Global Competition Review, ‘The European 
Antitrust Review 2012” 3, S Thomas, “Guilty of a Fault that one has not Committed. The Limits of 
the Group-Based Sanction Policy Carried out by the Commission and the European Courts in EU-
Antitrust Law” [2012] Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 11, K Hofstetter and M 
Ludescher, “Fines against Parent Companies in EU Antitrust Law: Setting Incentives for ‘Best 
Practice Compliance’” World Competition 33 (2010) 55 and M Bronckers and A Vallery, “No 
Longer Presumed Guilty? The Impact of Fundamental Rights on Certain Dogmas of EU 
Competition Law” World Competition 34 (2011) 535.  
17
  See especially, WPJ Wils, “The Undertaking as Subject of E.C. Competition Law and the 
Imputation of Infringements to Natural or Legal Persons” (2000) 25 ELRev 99 and C Townley, 
“The Concept of an ‘Undertaking’: The Boundaries of the Corporation – a discussion of agency, 
employees and subsidiaries”, in Amato, G., and Ehlermann, C-D. (eds.), EC Competition Law: a 
critical assessment, (Hart Publishing 2007). There is, however, a huge body of literature dealing 
with the limits of the similar single economic entity doctrine in the US, see e.g., H Hovenkamp, 
“American Needle and the Boundaries of the Firm in Antitrust Law (August 15, 2010), available at 
SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616625, Hovenkamp and CR Leslie (n 22), Devlin and Jacobs (n 
15) and E Reddick, “Joint Ventures And Other Competitor Collaborations As 
Single Entity— “Undertakings” Under US Law” [2012] 8(2) European Competition Journal 333.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
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persons (made up of individuals) and groups of persons (made up of natural or legal 
persons). The concept of an undertaking is aimed at economic units “which consist of a 
unitary organization of personal, tangible and intangible elements which pursues a 
specific economic aim on a long-term basis and can contribute to the commission of 
an infringement”.18  
Individuals, such as a member of the bar or another sole trader, (natural 
persons) may constitute an undertaking when operating as independent economic 
actors on a market for goods or services.
19
 In Wouters v Algemene Raad van de 
Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten
20
 for example, the CJ held that members of the 
Dutch bar which offered, for a fee, legal services and which bore the financial risks 
attaching to the performance of those activities carried on economic activities and so 
constituted undertakings. Further, legal persons, such as companies and 
partnerships,
21
 although made up of a collection of individual persons, may also be 
undertakings. The cases do not seem to look behind the legal personality but treat 
individuals working within the legal person, and not accepting individual risk, as 
constituent elements of it.
22
 Thus in Becu the CJ held that dock workers, performing 
 
18
  Case T-11/89, Shell International Chemical Company v Commission [1992] ECR II-757, para 311. 
19
  See e.g., Case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, 
[2002] ECR I-1577, paras 46–9, 64, RAI/UNITEL [1978] OJ L157/39, French Beef [2003] OJ 
L209/12, aff’d (but fines reduced) in Cases T-217 & 245/03, FNSEA v Commission [2004] ECR II-
271, Cases C-101 & 110/07, Coop de France bétail et viande v Commission [2008] ECR I-10193, 
Case 42/84, Remia BV and others v Commission [1985] ECR 2545 and Case C-189/02P, Dansk 
Rørindustri A/S v Commission  (“[a] natural person …cannot, in his sole capacity as a member or 
shareholder, be classified as an undertaking”). 
20
  Case C-309/99 (n 19). 
21
  See e.g., Case 258/78, Nungesser v Commission [1982] ECR 2015 and Breeders’ rights: roses 
[1985] OJ L369/9. See also sporting bodies (Distribution of Package Tours During the 1990 World 
Cup [1992] OJ L326/31, paras 43–58), trade associations (Case 96/82, NV IAZ International 
Belgium v Commission [1983] ECR 3369) and agricultural cooperatives (Case C-250/92, Gøttrup-
Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641). 
See also n 22. 
22
  There is thus a difficult line to be drawn between legal entities, economic units and cartels. Firms 
such as companies and partnerships inevitably eliminate competition, and result in price fixing and 
market sharing competition, between individuals within them. Characterisation of a partnership as 
an undertaking renders such arrangements per se legal under Article 101. In contrast an agreement 
between independent competing undertakings to fix prices and share markets is almost invariably 
illegal under Article 101, see e.g., RH Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 
(Basic Books, 1978, reprinted with a new Introduction and Epilogue, 1993), 264-265 and H 
Hovenkamp and CR Leslie, “The Firm as Cartel Manager” (2011) 64(3) Vanderbilt Law Review 
813, 818 (“[t]he lines between firms, cartels and joint ventures are notoriously indistinct”). In the 
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work for and under the direction of their employers, were to be viewed as being 
incorporated into the undertaking concerned and forming part of the “economic 
unit”.23 
 Although a decision to equate the term undertaking with natural or legal 
personality under national law would have provided some legal certainty and made 
the identification of an undertaking in EU competition law relatively simple, it has 
been seen that this is not the approach which has been adopted. On the contrary, it is 
clear that one or more legal persons designating an economic unit can constitute a 
single undertaking. For example, the close economic links which exist in many 
relationships between principal and agent have led the Court of Justice (“CJ”)  to 
recognise that an independently owned agent may lose its character as an independent 
trader and operate as an auxiliary organ “forming an integral part of the principal's 
undertaking”24 where the agent does not take on any (or only a negligible portion of) 
financial and commercial risk linked to sales of goods to third parties on behalf of the 
principal (even it seems if the agent acts for more than one principal).
25
 Like the 
employee, therefore, the agent who does not accept the risk of the principal’s 
business, seems to be viewed not as an entity engaged in economic activity but as 
incorporated within the undertaking, providing services for and at the direction of the 
principal. Reflecting the functional approach taken to the concept of undertaking, 
however, the CJ had held that it only with regard to the market on which the agent 
 
US, for example, partners, officers and employees of partnerships are also treated as constituent 
elements of a whole, see e.g. Devlin and Jacobs (n 15). 
23
  Case C-22/98, Criminal Proceedings against Becu [1999] ECR I-5665, para 26. For the view that 
employees are not undertakings as they do not engage in economic activity (work and labour is 
distinct from the provision of goods and services), see e.g., Jacobs AG in Case 67/96, Albany 
International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1996] ECR I-05457. See also 
e.g., CNSD [1993] OJ L203/27, Cases C-180-184/98, Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting 
Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECR I-6451 and Townley (n 17). 
24
  Case C-266/93, Bundeskartellamt v Volkswagen and VAG Leasing GmbH [1995] ECR I-3477, 
paras 18-19. See also Case C-279/06, CEPSA [2008] ECR I-6681, para 35 relying on Case C-
217/05, CEES [2006] ECR I-11987, para 38. Contrast, Cases 46&58/64, Consten and Grundig 
[1966] ECR 299 (where the CJ rejected the argument that a vertical agreement did not constitute 
an agreement between undertakings as the supplier and distributor were not on an equal footing 
and were not competitors and distinguished this situation from that in which a producer includes 
within his undertaking the distribution of his own products by some means, e.g., through a 
commercial representative, “These situations are distinct in law and, moreover, need to be assessed 
differently, since two marketing organisations, one of which is integrated into the manufacturer’s 
undertaking while the other is not, may not necessarily have the same efficiency”, 340). 
25
  CEPSA (n 24), para 36 relying on CEES (n 24), para 46. 
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offers its principal’s goods or services to potential customers that the agent is regarded 
as an auxiliary part of the principal’s business. In contrast, the agent is normally 
regarded as an independent operator and undertaking with regard to the market on 
which it offers its agency services to potential principals.
26
  
The CJ has also held that, in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships, entities 
will constitute a single economic unit if a subsidiary “enjoys no economic 
independence”27 or if the entities “form an economic unit within which the subsidiary 
has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market”28 but carries out 
the instructions issued by the parent company controlling them. Consequently, 
agreements and concerted practices between the parent and subsidiary forming part of 
the same economic unit, and concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks 
between the entities,
29
 fall outside of Article 101 as there is no agreement between 
economically independent entities. In Viho,
30
 for example, the CJ confirmed that the 
Commission had been correct to reject a complaint that Parker’s distribution 
agreements concluded with its 100% owned subsidiaries infringed Article 101. Parker 
controlled the sales, advertising and marketing policy of its subsidiaries which had no 
real autonomy to determine their course of action and thus formed a “single economic 
entity” with them. In Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v Compact del Dott Ing Mario 
Andreoli & C Sas,
31
 the CJ also confirmed that a natural person, a limited partnership 
and another firm constituted (and so counted as) a single economic unit when they 





  CEPSA (n 24), para 41; CEES (n 24), paras 62–3. 
27
  Case 22/71, Béguelin Import v GL Import-Export [1971] ECR 949, para 8. 
28
  Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV and Adnaan De Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc [1974] ECR 1183, para 41. 
See also Case 170/83, Hydrotherm (n 11), para 11; Case T-11/89, Shell v Commission [1992] ECR 
II-884, para 311; Wils (n 17). 
29
    Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV (n 28 above), para 41 (the Commission had submitted that Art 101 was 
not applicable to agreements where their sole object was the allocation of tasks within the same 
economic unit but that it would apply to agreements having a wider scope, see also Trabucchi AG) 
and Case 30/87 Bodson v Pompes Funèbres [1988] ECR 2479, para 19.  
30
  Case C-73/95 P, Viho Europe BV v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457.  
31
  Case 170/83 (n 11). 
32
  See also n 11 and accompanying text. The terminology used in this case is rather confusing 
however as the judgment also refers to the partnership and the firm as undertakings and so 
concludes that the block exemption regulation can be applied “even if several legally independent 
undertakings participate in the agreement as one contracting party provided that those undertakings 
constitute an economic unit for the purposes of the agreement”, para 12. This seems to suggest that 
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Although the rationale underpinning these judgments has not been made explicit, 
in Hydrotherm the CJ stated that where entities form part of the same economic unit, 
competition between the parties is impossible.
33
 The Court thus seems to consider that 
the arrangements between such entities resemble the internal workings of the firm and 
that the unity of purpose that they pursue renders meaningless the application of Article 
101 to agreements between them (there is no competition to be protected
34
).  If the 
subsidiary’s strategy is determined by the parent, the parent and subsidiary will pursue a 
common course irrespective of the existence of any agreement between them: “the 
unified conduct on the market of the parent company and its subsidiaries takes 
precedence over the formal separation between those companies as a result of their 
separate legal personalities”.35  A similar point was made by the US Supreme Court in 
Copperweld Corporation v Independence Tube Corporation when it held that a parent 
and its wholly-owned subsidiary were incapable of conspiring with one another for 
the purposes of section 1 Sherman Act: 
 “With or without a formal ‘agreement’ the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the 
parent, its sole shareholder. … If a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary do 
‘agree’ to a course of action, there is no sudden joining of economic resources that 
had previously served different interests, and there is no justification for §1 
scrutiny. ...  They share a common purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight 
rein over the subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the 
subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests”. 36 
2. The breadth of the economic unit  
a. Elucidating the meaning of an undertaking in attribution of liability cases 
The cases establish that agreements between legally distinct entities may be treated as 
the independent action of a single economic unit but do not indicate how broadly the 
 
the undertaking as an economic unit can be comprised of a number of undertakings, which are 
natural or legal persons, see also Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV (n 28), para 32 and Case T-102/92, 
Viho Europe BV v Commission [1995] ECR II-117, paras 47-53, see C.3.a below. 
33
  Case 170/83 (n 11), para 11, but see also n 24. 
34
  For an interesting discussion of the cases dealing with this issue and the principles underpinning 
them see Lenz AG in Case C-73/95 P, Viho (n 30), paras 31-73, especially para 67. 
35
  Case T-102/92, Viho (n 32), para 50. 
36
  467 US 752, 769, 767- 772 (1984). 
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doctrine applies and, in particular, exactly when a subsidiary has sufficient 
independence to prevent the doctrine from applying: ie precisely when it excludes 
from the scope of Article 101 arrangements between a parent company and a 
subsidiary (whether wholly, partially or jointly owned) and/or between two 
subsidiaries wholly, or partially, owned by the same parent company (“sister 
corporations”).  
Although there is relatively little case-law which deals with the question of 
when an agreement falls outside the ambit of Article 101 on the basis of the single 
economic unit principle (and so when the concept of an undertaking affects the 
substantive reach of Article 101), the doctrine has been utilized in other scenarios
37
 
and, importantly, in attribution of liability cases, as a mechanism for imposing 
liability and responsibility for an infringement of the competition law rules committed 
by a subsidiary on its parent company. The rationale relied on for such an application 
is this: a subsidiary commits a breach of Article 101 or 102; the subsidiary forms part 
of the same undertaking/economic unit as the parent if it does not decide 
independently upon its own conduct on the market, but carries out, in all material 
respects, the instructions given to it by the parent company; the Articles 101 and 102 
prohibitions are directed at “undertakings”; decisions penalising breaches of 
competition rules must be addressed to, and fines imposed on, persons, natural or 
legal; the economic unit doctrine allows
38
 the conduct of a subsidiary to be imputed to 
the parent which forms part of the same undertaking. Indeed, it is clear that the 
 
37
  E.g.: (i) when determining how many parties there are to an agreement, see Hydrotherm (n 31) (in 
this case the application of the block exemption was dependent upon there only being two 
undertakings party to the agreement. The agreement was concluded between Mr Andreoli and the 
two firms he controlled and Hydrotherm. The CJ confirmed that Mr Andreoli and the firms he 
controlled formed an economic unit and consequently counted as only one undertaking so the 
block exemption could apply); (ii) for calculating market shares in substantive analysis; and (iii) 
for determining the maximum level of the fine that can be imposed for breaching the competition 
law rules (which can be up to 10% of the undertakings total turnover in the previous year of 
business, Reg 1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1, art 23(2)), see also C.3.a below. It may also be possible that 
damages actions can be filed against a member of the economic unit where another member of that 
unit has committed a violation, see e.g., Cooper Tire & Rubber v. Shell Chemicals [2009] EWHC 
2609 (Comm), Provimi v Aventis [2003] EWHC 961 and Cases A3/2011/2816, Toshiba Carrier 
UK Ltd v KME and C3/2011/1658(A) Emerson Electric Co & Ors v Morgan Crucible Company 
PLC (these two latter cases are currently pending before the Court of Appeal. They raise the 
question of whether a victim of a cartel can bring an action for damages in the English courts 
against a UK subsidiary of a parent that was found to have violated Article 101, even if that 
subsidiary was not an addressee of the decision). 
38
  See Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission (Dyestuffs) [1972] ECR 619, paras 11 
and 131-140 and Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
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Commission’s policy in many cartel infringement cases is now, wherever possible, to 
attribute liability to parent companies. This policy maximizes the total level of fines 
both by augmenting the maximum cap on the level of fines which can be imposed 
(which is 10% of the  turnover of the undertaking as a whole
39
) and by enhancing the 
risk of a finding of recidivism, a deterrence uplift and civil damages’ claims.40 
The application of the doctrine in this way has proved controversial, 
prompting some to complain that such a use is unconvincing, illogical and breaches 
fundamental principles, in particular of personal responsibility and limited liability, 
and the presumption of innocence.
41
 Nonetheless, the EU courts have, to date, 
generally affirmed the Commission’s approach adhering to the view that as the 
“parent company and its subsidiary form a single economic unit and therefore a single 
undertaking” a decision imposing fines can be addressed “to the parent company, 
without having to establish the personal involvement of the latter in the 
infringement.”42 Responsibility for the competition law infringement falls to the 
undertaking/ economic unit as a whole.
43
  
The greater volume of cases decided in this area shed light on the question of 
how, in this context at least, it is determined whether or not the subsidiary and parent 
constitute part of the same economic unit.
44
 The key issue identified in the cases is 
whether the parent is able to, and does, exercise decisive influence over the policy and 
direct the conduct of its subsidiary, so that the subsidiary does not enjoy real 
autonomy or independence in determining its course of action in the market.
45
 
Critically, the cases establish that (i) where a parent holds a 100% shareholding in a 
 
39
  See nn 37 and 126. 
40
  The Commission has discretion as to whether to hold the parent jointly and severally liable with 
the corporate entity directly involved in the infringement. To maximise the deterrent effect of 
fines, the Commission’s “invariable policy today is to hold a group parent automatically 
responsible for cartel infringements committed down the line by its wholly owned subsidiaries.”  
Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 16), 3-4. 
41
  See e.g., articles cited in n 16, Ooms Avenhorn Holding BV v The Netherlands appl no 40490/11 
(appeal to the European Court of Human Rights) and further sections C and D. 
42
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), paras 58-59.  
43
   “The parent’s awareness of, still less its participation in, the subsidiaries’ wrongdoing has nothing 
to do with it. The acid test is whether together they compose one and the same undertaking”: 
Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 16), 3.  
44
  See nn 27&28 above. 
45
  Dyestuffs (n 38), paras 125-146. 
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subsidiary, or a de minimis amount less than 100%,
46
 a rebuttable presumption that 
the parent does in fact exercise decisive influence over the commercial policy and 
conduct of its subsidiary applies;
47
 and (ii) the exercise of decisive influence can be 
ascertained in other situations “on the basis of a body of factual evidence, including, 
in particular, any management power exercised by the parent company or companies 
over their subsidiary”.48  
b. Defining control and decisive influence 
The concepts of control and decisive influence utilized in the cases are also concepts 
that are used in EUMR to determine whether a “concentration” (or merger) occurs. 
The term concentration catches mergers between independent undertakings and 
changes in, or acquisitions of, control of an undertaking – that is situations where one 
or more undertakings acquire control (sole or joint) of the whole or part of one or 
more other undertakings through the acquisition of rights which confer the possibility 
of exercising decisive influence on that other (most commonly from the acquisition of 
shares).
49
 Control and decisive influence in the EUMR context has been interpreted 
broadly to include sole or joint control acquired on a de jure or de facto basis. Positive 
(sole) control is acquired where an undertaking acquires rights which allow it to 
determine the strategic direction of another undertaking. Negative control arises 
where rights acquired allow the rights holder to block important strategic decisions to 
be followed by the subsidiary but not actually to decide strategic direction.
50
 It 
includes the creation of JVs which are jointly controlled by two or more parents and 
 
46
  See e.g., Case T-299/08, Elf Aquitaine v Commission, 17 May 2011. 
47
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 60, Cases C-201&216/09 P, ArcelorMittal Luxembourg SA v Commission 
29 March 2011,and AEG v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, para 50. It is for the parent to rebut the 
presumption by submitting evidence relating to the organisational, economic and legal links 
between its subsidiary and itself which are apt to demonstrate that they do not constitute a single 
economic entity: ibid, para 65. The Commission is obliged to consider the rebuttal evidence and if 
it fails to do so its decision will be overturned, see eg Case T-185/06, L’Air liquide SA v 
Commission 6 June 2011. 
48
  Case T-132/07, Fuji Electric System Co. Ltd v Commission 12 July 2011, para 181 relying on Case 
T-314/01, Avebe v Commission [2006] ECR II-3085, para 136.  
49
  EUMR, art 3(2).  
50
  The EUMR also applies to changes in the quality of control. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2131740 
  
which perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity 
(a “full-function’ JV which is fully autonomous from an operational point of view”).51 
The view could be taken that to ensure consistency and symmetry between the 
EU competition law provisions, the principles to be applied to determine whether a 
parent and its subsidiary form part of a single economic unit (and undertaking) should 
relate to, and be consistent with, those which apply when determining whether there is 
a concentration within the meaning of the EUMR. Wouter Wils,
52
 for example, has 
argued that to ensure a coherent competition policy Article 101 should not apply to 
arrangements between companies which are linked in such a way that the links would 
amount to the acquisition of sole control within the meaning of the EUMR. If one 
firm acquires sole control over another (with the possibility of exercising decisive 
influence over that other) so that a concentration is considered to have occurred, that 
should be sufficient, if the merger is authorised, to conclude that, post-merger, the 
previously separate entities now operate as an integrated single undertaking. In his 
view, therefore, the notion of undertaking under Article 101 should coincide with, and 
relate to, the notion of sole control under the EUMR so that both coincide with the 
economic notion of the firm the distinctive characteristic of which is “the existence of 
authority or the power to exercise control over people and physical assets”53. 
Although the cases dealing with the concept of undertaking in attribution of 
liability cases have not generally sought guidance from EUMR practice,
54
 they have 
extended the notion of control to cover situations of both sole and joint control. 
 
51
  Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings [2008] C95/1, para 61 and IV. Joint control 
arises where no one shareholder has the power to determine the strategic decision in the subsidiary 
but where two or more shareholders may block actions which determine the strategic commercial 
behaviour of the JV and must reach a common understanding in determining its commercial 
policy. 
52
  Wils (n 17). 
53
  ibid. Wils thus proposes a common notion of undertaking which flows through Article 101, 102 
and the EUMR. The theory of the firm derives from the writing of Ronald Coase, “The Nature of 
the Firm” 1937 Economica vol 4 (consisting “of the system of relationships which comes into 
existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur”. Resource allocation 
within a firm is not guided through prices (as in the market) but through direct managerial control. 
In economics therefore a firm is characterised as a single decision-taker and pursues a single goal 
(of profit maximisation)). 
54
  But see n 64 and accompanying text, Commission’s Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, 
SEC(2010) 528/2,  para 11, n 7 (although this part of the paragraph was not repeated in the final 
version of the guidelines). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2131740 
  
Indeed, they indicate that conditions may be satisfied where a parent has sole positive 
control over its subsidiary acquired on a de jure basis, whether through a 100% 
holding,
55
 the holding of a majority interest
56
 or the holding minority interest  in a 
subsidiary which is allied to rights greater than those normally granted to minority 
shareholders.
57
 Further they have held that entities may form an economic unit where 
a parent has negative control over its subsidiary, at least where two or more parents 
have negative control over their JV and so cooperate to determine the JV’s 
commercial policy – that is, in situations where the parents have the power to 
exercise, and have actually exercised, joint control over a JV.  In Avebe
58
 the GC 
equated the situation of both Akzo and Avebe, parents holding a 50% stake in their 
jointly controlled JV, Glucona, as analogous to the situation in which a single parent 
company held 100% of its subsidiary for the purpose of establishing the presumption 
that the parent company actually exerted a decisive influence over its subsidiary’s 
conduct. Thus it concluded that the Commission had not erred in holding that, because 
of the close economic and legal links between Glucona, Akzo and Avebe, Avebe 
could be held liable for Glucona’s unlawful conduct and that “Glucona, on the one 
hand, and Akzo and Avebe, on the other, do form an economic unit … in the context 
of which the unlawful conduct of the subsidiary may be imputed to the parent 
companies, who become liable by virtue of the fact that they in reality control its 
marketing policy.”59  
In Avebe the JV did not have legal personality and the parents had knowledge 
of the infringing conduct. The GC affirmed the principle, however, in Fuji
60
 and in 
 
55
  See n 47. 
56
  “It is generally the case that if a parent company holds a majority interest in the subsidiary’s share 
capital, that can enable it actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary and, in 
particular, on the subsidiary’s market conduct”. Case T-141/89 Tréfileurop Sales SARL v 
Commission [1995] ECR II-791. See also Cases 6,7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and 
Commercial Solvents Corporation v Commission [1974] ECR 223 (parent and subsidiary in which 
the parent held a 51% share, were to be treated as an economic unit). 
57
  Fuji Electric (n 48), para 183 (even a minority interest may enable a parent company “actually to 
exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary’s market conduct, if it is allied to rights greater than 
those normally granted to minority shareholders in order to protect their financial interest and 
which, when considered in the light of a set of consistent legal or economic indicia, are such as to 
show that a decisive influence is exercised over the subsidiary’s market conduct.”).  
58
  Avebe (n 48), especially paras 138-39.  
59
  Avebe (n 48), para 141.  
60
  Fuji Electric (n 48). 
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Dow Chemical (and the related case of EI du Pont de Nemours).
61
 In Fuji the Court 
concluded that the Commission had demonstrated that Fuji actually exercised a 
decisive influence on the market conduct of its JV, on the basis of factual evidence 
including management power exercised,
62
 and was fully entitled to hold Fuji jointly 
and severally liable with the JV for the infringement. Further, in Dow the GC upheld 
the Commission’s finding that Dow and EI Du Pont were jointly and severally liable 
for the infringement of their JV (the creation of which had been approved under the 
EUMR) and formed part of the same economic unit with it. Relying amongst other 
things
63
 on the fact that the Commission had found that they had acquired joint 
control of the JV when appraising it under the EUMR,
64
 the Court agreed that they 
had the power to jointly control their JV and further that, in the light of all the 
economic, legal and organizational links, control had actually been exercised.  In so 
doing the GC specifically rejected the argument that as the parents merely exercised 
joint negative control they only had a right of veto over the commercial strategy of the 
JV and not the power to exercise decisive influence over its day-to-day management:  
“The ‘negative’ nature of the joint control is not sufficient to preclude the 
exercise of decisive influence over [JV]. Even if parent companies are not able 
to impose decisions on their joint venture, they are able to prevent their joint 
venture from taking certain decisions and thereby exercise decisive influence 
 
61
  Case T-77/08, The Dow Chemical Company v Commission 2 Feb 2012,  Case C-179/12 P 
,judgment pending (Dow has appealed on the grounds that it did not exercise decisive influence of 
the JV and so did not participate in the infringement committed by it and that the GC had 
misinterpreted the concepts of a single economic unit, of a single undertaking and of the exercise 
of decisive influence) and Case T-76/08, EI du Pont de Nemours v Commission, 2 February 2012, 
Case C-172/12 P , judgment pending.  
62
  For example the master agreement on the creation of the JV established that the founding 
companies had to agree on important decisions relating to the JV’s management and business and 
there was considerable overlapping senior management between the parent and JV. The 
Commission had found that the factual record established that Hitachi and Fuji were able to 
exercise and have actually exercised a decisive influence with regard to the involvement of the JV 
in the cartel activities and that the JV did not determine autonomously its market behaviour, but 
followed the commercial practices and behaviour established by Hitachi and Fuji. “By transferring 
their GIS interests to [the JV], Hitachi and Fuji were in effect using [JV] as a vehicle to continue 
their long standing involvement in the cartel”. 
63
  E.g., the fact that each had the right to participate on a Members’ Committee which approved 
certain matters pertaining to the strategic direction of the JV, they had both withdrawn from the 
Chloroprene Rubber market and participated on it only through their JV. Net profits or losses of JV 
were allocated in equal proportions to the two parents. 
64
  Case IV/M.663 
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over its business strategy … The ‘negative’ nature of the control that the 
applicant held over [JV] did not therefore prevent it from exercising over [JV] 
sufficient decisive influence to enable the Commission to impute to it the 
unlawful conduct of that joint venture”.65 
The GC also held that the fact that the Commission had found that the JV was an 
autonomous full-function JV for the purposes of the EUMR
66
 did not mean that it was 
autonomous in the sense that it was free from the exercise of decisive influence by its 
parent on its commercial conduct and policies. The operational autonomy required of 
full-function JVs under the EUMR thus does not “mean that the joint venture enjoys 
autonomy as regards the adoption of its strategic decisions (and that it is not therefore 
under the decisive influence exercised by its parent companies for the purposes of the 
application of Article [101])”.67 The question of whether the GC has correctly 
interpreted the concepts of undertaking, economic unit and decisive influence is now 
pending for resolution before the CJ. 
 Although the terms control and decisive influence have been defined broadly 
in these undertaking cases, they are not clearly identical to those utilized in the EUMR 
context. Not only do they extend to cover all jointly controlled JVs (whether or not 
created as an autonomous full- function JV or another JV falling within the 
jurisdiction of, and cleared under, the EUMR
68
) but it is has yet to be decided if they 
extend, for example, to sole negative control.
69
 Further, in contrast to the position 
under the EUMR where it is necessary only to assess whether rights to be acquired 
give a parent the possibility of exercising decisive influence over the subsidiary,
70
 the 
cases have consistently stressed that such a possibility is not enough - it must also be 
considered whether that power has actually been exercised i.e. whether the persons on 
 
65
  Dow (n 61), para 92. 
66
  See further section (e) below. 
67
  Dow (n 61), para 93. 
68
  The finding of economic unity in these cases stemmed simply from the exercise by the parents of 
joint control and decisive influence over the conduct of the JV: its operational autonomy and the 
question of whether its creation had been approved under the EUMR or was consistent with Article 
101 seemed to be irrelevant, see also e.g., Candle Waxes, 1 October 2008, para 481. 
69
  But see n 65 and accompanying text. 
70
  That is, its ability to control the strategic commercial behaviour of the undertaking concerned, on a 
de jure or de facto basis, through its shareholdings, property rights, assets, and/or through contracts 
and shareholders agreement, EUMR, art 3(1)(b) and (2) and Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), para 16.  
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whom liability is to be imposed “either directly managed that undertaking or in fact 
exercised control over the persons who were managing that undertaking and thereby 
determined their conduct on the market”.71 The extent to which this latter requirement 
in fact constitutes a material difference is controversial, however. In particular, in 
some scenarios the question of whether power has actually been exercised appears to 
be inferred from the potential/power to do so. For example, it has been seen that in 
cases where the parent owns 100%, or a de minimis amount less, of the shareholding 
in the subsidiary it is presumed that decisive influence has been exercised and it is 
uncertain whether, and if so how, that presumption can be rebutted.
72
 Further, even in 
cases of smaller shareholdings it seems that actual decisive influence may be inferred 
from evidence deriving from the organisational and economic links between the 
entities and the potential to exercise decisive influence. Indeed, as it seems clear that 
actual decisive influence does not necessarily have to result from specific instructions 
on elements of commercial policy but can arise even when a parent does not make use 
of any actual rights of co-determination and refrains from giving specific instructions 
or guidelines on individual elements of a commercial policy
73
 it appears that the 
power to exercise decisive influence will often be the determining factor. 
C. A SINGLE CONCEPT OF AN UNDERTAKING? 
1. Support for a single concept of an undertaking in EU competition law 
The case-law explored in section B suggests that the concept of an undertaking is a 
relatively broad one centred on the notion of control and encompassing: 
(a) Natural persons; 
(b) Persons bound together by a contractual relationship which results in one person 
working for and under the direction of another and so being integrated within  that 
 
71
  “It must be pointed out in that regard that, according to that case-law and contrary to the 
Commission's assertions …, the Commission cannot merely find that an undertaking “was able to” 
exert such a decisive influence over the other undertaking, without checking whether that influence 
actually was exerted. On the contrary, it follows from that case-law that it is, in principle, for the 
Commission to demonstrate such decisive influence on the basis of factual evidence, including, in 
particular, any management power one of the undertakings may have over the other …” Avebe (n 
48 above), para 136. 
72
  See Joshua, Botteman & Atlee (n 43) and ArcelorMittal (n 47), Bot AG. 
73
  See eg Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 73, Kokott AG, paras 89-93 and Dow (n 61), paras 77, 81 and 101. 
This has led some firms to complain that the rules in this area breach the presumption of innocence 
from which they benefit in EU competition law. 
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other (for example, an employment or agency contract) or one person controlling 
the behaviour of another;
74
 
(c) A parent and a subsidiary, where the latter has no freedom to determine its course 
of action or economic independence as the parent has sufficient rights to exercise, 
and does actually exercise, positive control over its behaviour (for example, where 
the parent owns 100% in the share capital in the subsidiary, a majority interest 
which enables it actually to exercise a decisive influence on its subsidiary or a 
minority interest which enables it to exercise a decisive influence on its 
subsidiary’s market conduct, because it is allied to rights greater than those 
normally granted to minority shareholders); 
(d) (Possibly) a parent and a subsidiary, where the latter has sufficient rights to veto 
strategic decisions of the latter, and actually exercises such negative control over 
its behaviour; 
(e) A parent and all subsidiaries which are controlled (within the meaning of (c) or (d) 
above) by the same parent; 
(f) A JV and parents who have the power to, and do actually, exercise jointly control 
and decisive influence over the JV’s behaviour. 
A majority of the case-law in this area has, however, arisen in in context of 
proceedings relating to the attribution of liability to parents for the behaviour of their 
subsidiaries. An essential issue, therefore, is whether the notion of an undertaking is 
the same in all contexts and, in particular, whether the principles developed in the 
“attribution of liability” cases can be read across and applied to a situation where the 
matter at issue is the “substantive reach” of Article 101  (and vice versa)? 
Although it will be seen that a strong argument could be made that there 
should be a context-specific approach to the concept of an undertaking,
75
 the cases do 
 
74
  See e.g., Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), para 20 (suggesting that for the purposes of the EUMR 
certain contractual relationships may be sufficient to give one undertaking control over another – 
e.g. a long term supply agreement leading to a position of economic dependence, but not a 
franchising arrangement). See also the Commission’s decision in Bananas where the Commission 
found that the combination of a partnership and distribution agreement was sufficient to give Del 
Monte the possibility to exercise decisive influence on the way Weichart ran its business and that 
Del Monte did exercise such influence, paras 383-385. 
75
  In e.g., Singapore, the Competition Commission has held that two entities may not form a single 
economic entity in one context (e.g. where the issues is whether agreements between the entities 
should be excluded from its prohibition of anticompetitive agreements) even though they may do 
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generally suggest that the principles apply to both situations without distinction.
76
 
First, the cases all hinge on the interpretation of the term “undertaking”, without any 
suggestion that the concept should be considered differently in differing scenarios. 
Secondly, in Flat Glass
77
 the GC clarified that the term “undertaking” has the same 
meaning in Article 102 as to the one given to it in the context of Article 101 and in 
Hydrotherm
78
 the CJ held that "in competition law, the term 'undertaking' must be 
understood as designating an economic unit …”. Thirdly, in both Dyestuffs79 and 
Viho,
80
 the CJ held that the consequence of the economic doctrine was both that 
Article 101(1) was inapplicable in the relationship between the entities within it and 
that the actions of the subsidiary could be attributed to the parent company.
81
 
Fourthly, in a number of cases there has been cross-referral between the lines of cases. 
In AKZO Nobel,
82
 for example, the General Court (GC) relied on Viho as a case 
providing authority as to the type of evidence relevant when assessing whether a 
 
so in another context (e.g. where the issue is whether to hold one of the companies liable for the 
other’s competition infringement or whether to treat them as a single economic entity for the 
purposes of analysing the competitive effects of a merger), see CCS 400/003/06, Qantas-
Orangestar Cooperation Agreement 5 March 2007. 
76
  See also P Roth QC and V Rose, Bellamy & Child: European Community Law of Competition 
(OUP, 6
th
 Edn, 2008), 2.017 (setting out the view that the principles established by the case law 
apply without distinction to both situations) and J Faull and A Nikpay (eds), The EC Law of 
Competition (2nd edn, OUP 2007) 3.89. 
77
  Joined Cases T-68, 77-78/89, Società Italiano Vetro SpA v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, at 
paras 357–8.  
78
  Case 170/83 (n 11), para 11. See also Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, 
para 11, n 8. 
79
  ICI (n 38), paras 132-36 
80
  Viho (n 30) para 16. In Case T-102/92, Viho (n 32) the GC also relied on cases concerning parental 
liability in its judgment upholding the Commission’s conclusion that agreements between Parker 
Pen and its subsidiaries fell outside of Article 101(1). Indeed it concluded that the Commission had 
been correct in finding that because the subsidiaries’ conduct could be imputed to the parent that 
the integrated distribution system fell outside of Article 101. 
81
  See ArcelorMittal (n 47), Bot AG, para 178 (the concept of undertaking “has the consequence of 
excluding the application of Article 101(1) TFEU to agreements between a subsidiary and its 
parent company, since there is no agreement ‘between undertakings’” and of allowing the conduct 
of a subsidiary to be attributed to a parent where the latter does not determine its market behaviour 
autonomously). 
82
  Case T-112/05, AKZO Nobel v Commission [2007] ECR II-5049, paras 63-64. See also Fuji 
Electric (n 48), para 180 and Dow (n 61), para 73. 
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parent exercises decisive influence over a subsidiary. This aspect of the Court’s 
judgment was upheld by the CJ.
83
  
The cases do therefore provide considerable support for the view that a single 
concept of an undertaking exists for competition law purposes and, consequently that, 
in line with the attribution of liability cases, the following conduct is to be 
characterised as unilateral and not the joint conduct of two or more undertakings: 
agreements between a parent and subsidiary (where the former exercises decisive 
influence over the behaviour of the latter); agreements between sister companies;
84
 
and the conduct and operation of a JV where the latter forms “part of one undertaking 
with each of the parent companies that jointly exercise decisive influence and 
effective control over it”.85 Because of the functional approach taken to the concept of 
an undertaking, however, it would seem that any exclusion of conduct from Article 
101 would be dependent upon the conduct at issue relating to the internal working of, 
or the internal allocation of responsibilities within, the economic unit.
86
 In the context 
of a JV, this would suggest that only conduct inherent to the working and operation of 
the JV falls outside of Article 101.
87
 The conduct of the JV, when acting within its 
scope, would thus be regarded as the conduct of a single entity and Article 101 should 
not apply “to agreements between the parent and such a joint venture … Article 101 
could, however, apply to agreements between the parents outside the scope of the 
joint venture”.88 In these substantive reach cases, therefore, it may be that the question 
 
83
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), paras 72-78. 
84
  Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 11 (“Horizontal Co-
operation Guidelines”) (“the same is true for sister companies, that is to say companies over which 
decisive influence is exercised by the same parent company. They are consequently not considered 
to be competitors even if they are both active on the same relevant product and geographic 
markets.”) 
85
  Draft Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, (n 54), para 11 (this part of the paragraph was not 
repeated in the final version of the Guidelines, however). But see also eg, Case No.IV/M.527 
Thomson CSF/Deutsche Aerospace AG (1994), para 8. 
86
  See nn 34&26 above, but see Viho (n 30), paras 14-18 and Wils (n 17), 107. 
87
  This of course leaves a difficult line to be drawn between conduct relating to the working of the 
economic unit (exempted from Article 101) and that which goes beyond it (falling within Article 
101). Unilateral conduct could be caught by Art 102, however.  
88
   “and with regard to the agreement between the parents to create the joint venture”, Draft 
Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines, (n 54), para 11 (this part of the paragraph was not repeated in 
the final version of the Guidelines, however).   
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of whether the entities are acting as a single undertaking will turn on the complex 
question of whether the conduct limits competition among the parents and the JV 
outside of its core operations.
89
 
2. Factors militating against a single concept of an undertaking: concerns 
about the breadth of the current case-law and inconsistencies 
a.  The breadth of the principle expounded 
Although recognition of a single concept of an undertaking in EU competition law 
would provide greatest coherence to the system, a number of concerns potentially 
result from the conclusion that the notion of an undertaking, at least as it has currently 
been defined, is the same in each line of cases. Not only do the attribution of liability 
cases seem to push the concept to a broad limit without specific reference to the 
underlying objectives of the doctrine or to its consequences for the reach and scope of 
Article 101, but the interpretation given in some of these cases is difficult to reconcile 
with other strands of jurisprudence and legislation.  
b.  Do the principles underlying the single economic unit doctrine in each line of 
cases dictate different outcomes? 
It has been seen that in cases dealing with the substantive reach of Article 101, the 
policy appears to be to take outside of Article 101 arrangements which resemble the 
internal workings of a firm or arrangements between entities which are in any event 
bound to pursue a common policy on the market. In attribution of liability cases, 
however, the policy seems rather different. In the absence of exceptional 





  See further n 134 and accompanying text and e.g. the view of the US government, ‘Brief for the 
United States and Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner: American Needle,’ 
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f250300/250316.htm> pt 2, (a JV’s conduct could be unilateral 
under the antitrust laws if: (1) the parents had effectively merged the relevant aspect of their 
operations in a specific sphere (thereby eliminating actual and potential competition among the 
parents and between the parents and the JV in that operational sphere); and (2) the challenged 
restraint did not significantly affect actual or potential competition among the parents or between 
the parents and the JV outside their merged operations). 
90
  In England & Wales, for example, “[t]here is no general principle that all companies in a group are 
to be regarded as one. On the contrary, the fundamental principle is that each company in a group 
of companies (a relatively modern concept) is a separate legal entity possessed of separate rights 
and liabilities” Adams v Cape Industries [1990] Ch 433, per Slade LJ. See also Bronckers & 
Vallery (n 16), 551 (“a recent, careful review of the law of Belgium, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States shows that, despite considerable differences in approach even 
within one and the same country, corporate veils are only pierced in the presence of particular 
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and to impose liability for the conduct of a company on its parents or shareholders. In 
the attribution line of cases therefore the crucial issue appears to be exactly when it is 
appropriate to ignore the legal personality of the entity that committed the 
infringement, to pierce the corporate veil and to impose liability on a parent for an 
infringement it did not itself commit (particularly where such liability may result in the 
imposition of punitive fines of a criminal nature).
91
 These two different underlying 
objectives would not necessarily seem to dictate the same answer to the question of 
what constitutes an economic unit.
92
   
In attribution of liability cases, for example, it is essential that the parent is 
found to have personal responsibility
93
 for the infringement at issue – there must be 
some justification for lifting the corporate veil. Although the EU Courts have held that 
personal responsibility in competition cases derives not from the parent’s participation 
in, contribution to, or other awareness or involvement in the offence but from the 
responsibility of the undertaking as a whole for the breach,
94
 they have also 
emphasized, in assessing liability, the importance of the parent’s actual control over 
the behaviour of the subsidiary. “Even if the parent company does not participate 
 
circumstances: notably, intensive involvement of the parent in the subsidiary’s business, 
bankruptcy of the subsidiary caused by  a parent’s conduct, or specific concerns about abuse or 
lack of good faith in the case at issue”, relying on Vandekerckhove Piercing the Corporate Veil 
(Kluwer, 2007)). 
91
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), Kokott AG, para 38 (“[i]n selecting criteria for attributing offences, both the 
sanctionative nature of the measures imposed and their purpose must be taken into account”). 
92
  For the view that the economic unit principle was transplanted uncritically into the law governing 
fines, see e.g., Hofstetter & Ludescher (n 16) (“Ignoring the fundamental concept of limited 
liability for subsidiary corporations, the Commission seems to espouse a system of ‘guilt by 
association’ which, to be sure, lacks a sound basis in EU antitrust law. The legal entry door used 
by the Commission is the – misinterpreted – construct of the corporate group as an “undertaking”). 
93
  Given the nature of competition law infringements “and the nature and degree of severity of 
the ensuing penalties, responsibility for committing those infringements is personal in 
nature”, Case C-49/92, Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-04125, para 78. 
For the view that antitrust fines should primarily be aimed at deterrence and therefore be based on 
fault, see Hofstetter & Ludescher (n 16) (“Absent any direct involvement in the antitrust violations 
of the top representatives of a corporation, fault on the part of the company should be defined as a 
deficiency in its compliance organisation”). 
94
  Ibid, paras 56&77. For the view that the meaning of decisive influence has evolved from a general 
power to direct the subsidiary’s commercial policy into the virtually ineluctable consequence of 
the group’s structure alone, see n 43 and Thomas (n 16), II.B.4.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2131740 
  
directly in the infringement, it exercises, in such a case, a decisive influence over the 
subsidiaries which have participated in it”.95  
 This suggests that even though it is important that the parent and subsidiary 
are part of the same undertaking, this factor alone is not, or should not be, sufficient to 
impose liability – rather some fault or responsibility on the part of the parent is 
required. For example, the Commission has never sought to impute liability to a 
subsidiary for the conduct of its parent or to one sister corporation for the conduct of 
another (even if they can all be said to form part of the same economic unit). Rather, 
liability for an infringement by an entity within the economic unit is only imputed 
upwards to another entity which controls the behaviour of, or exercises decisive 
influence over, the entity in breach. In substantive reach cases, in contrast, the 
hierarchical relationship is not important. Rather, the doctrine can exclude 




 The requirement for personal responsibility on the part of the parent might 
also explain the condition set out in the cases that the parent must “actually” have 
exercised decisive influence of its subsidiary, and that the power to do so is not 
enough. Although evidence of actual exercise seems justifiable, and arguably 
essential, in this context,
97
 it is questionable whether such evidence should be 
necessary in substantive reach cases where the issue is simply whether the entities at 
issue operate unilaterally as a single economic entity rather than jointly. In 
determining whether a parent and subsidiary would be likely to adopt a common 
course of conduct on the market it would seem important to focus only on the 
question of whether the parent has the potential to exercise control over the conduct of 
its subsidiary: even if the subsidiary does not act in the best interest of the parent, the 
 
95
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 77: “In accordance with the principle of personal liability … under which 
a person can be held liable only for his own acts …, it falls, in principle, to the person managing 
the undertaking when the infringement was committed to answer for that infringement”; Case 
C-297/98 P, SCA Holding v Commission [2000] ECR I-10101, para  27; Case C-286/98 P, Stora 
Kopparbergs Bergslags v Commission [2000] ECR I-9925, para  37. 
96
  This could be because in each case the conduct of the subsidiary is treated as the conduct of, and 
imputed to, the parent, see n 80 above.  
97
  For the view that a presumption of parental liability for subsidiary conduct breaches fundamental 
principles of EU law, see authorities cited in n 16. 
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latter can always take full control and ensure that it does.
98
 A requirement to establish 
actual exercise of control in substantive reach cases would thus seem to render “the 
legality of agreements between companies under the same control” dependent “on 
whether the agreement could be established to have been centrally ordered by the 
parent company” without serving “any intelligible competition policy objective”.99 
Conversely, it could also be argued that the notion of an undertaking might 
have a more expansive role to play in attribution of liability cases. For example, it has 
been seen that the Commission seeks where possible to attribute liability to parent 
companies in order to maximize the deterrent effect of the fines it imposes. This 
policy has driven the Commission to push the concept more broadly and to use it to 
impute liability to parents which jointly control the behaviour of a JV. Although this 
use of the doctrine and its extension is in itself extremely contentious, in Dow the GC 
confirmed that negative control and the power to prevent the infringing behaviour of a 
subsidiary or JV might in certain circumstances be sufficient to constitute control. The 
CJ’s view on this matter is now awaited. Even if this view were to be upheld by the 
CJ, it is questionable whether negative control should be sufficient to ensure that the 
parent and subsidiary pursue a common course of conduct – the rationale for 
excluding the application of Article 101 in substantive reach cases. Further, 
application of such a far-reaching concept of an undertaking extending, in particular 
to JVs, raises concern that the conduct of an entity controlled by a group of 
competitors, and used as a vehicle for cooperation between them, may escape Article 
101 scrutiny and is difficult to reconcile with earlier precedent dealing specifically 
with the substantive reach of Article 101 and the treatment of JVs under it.  
 
98
  Such an interpretation could avoid the rather circular situation where e.g., a contract could 
constitute a relevant factor in the assessment of whether the parent is actually exercising decisive 
influence over the subsidiary (and hence the determination of whether the agreement falls outside 
Article 101). If the parent has the possibility of exercising decisive influence and controlling the 
subsidiary’s conduct, it can exercise control irrespective of the agreement, see n 36 and 
accompanying text 
99
  Wils (n 17), 107. As Wils points out, however, the case-law dealing with the substantive reach of 
Article 101 is ambiguous on this point. Some early cases do not seem to require more than the 
potential to exercise decisive influence, others seems to suggest that actual exercise might be 
necessary. 
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In Centafarm the CJ held that only agreements between entities belonging to 
the “same concern”100 were excluded from Article 101. In line with this wording, the 
Commission seemed initially to have eschewed the idea that a JV and its parents form 
part of a single economic unit. In IJsselcentrale,
101
 for example, the Commission 
decided that a JV and its parent companies could not constitute a single economic unit 
as the behaviour of the firms within the group was not controlled by a single firm 
(they were not all part of the same concern): rather the behaviour of each parent was 
controlled independently. It thus rejected an argument that a cooperation agreement 
concluded between SEP, a company set up by four electricity generating companies as 
a vehicle for cooperation between them, and its parent companies fell outside of 
Article 101 on the grounds that the participating electricity generators together formed 
an economic unit, the components in “one indivisible public electricity supply 
system.”102 Rather, it held that the four companies did not belong to a single group of 
companies. “They are separate legal persons, and are not controlled by a single 
person, natural or legal. Each generating company determines its own conduct 
independently”.103 
In other cases the Commission also seemed to rule out application of the 
economic unit doctrine where a parent could not itself decisively influence the 
commercial strategy of the JV (suggesting that sole positive control is required before 
the exercise of decisive influence can be established and the ability of the JV to act 
independently/autonomously ruled out). In Gosmé/Martell-DMP the Commission 
concluded that DMP, a joint subsidiary of Martell and Piper-Heidsieck,
104
 and Martell 
were independent undertakings within the meaning of Article 101 as Martell was not 
in a position to control the commercial activity of DMP.
105
 Rather, it held only 50% of 
the capital and voting rights and was represented by only half the supervisory board 
 
100
  n 28, para 41. 
101
  [1991] OJ L28/3. 
102
  ibid para 22.  
103
  ibid para 24. Further, it could not be said that SEP formed an economic unit with one or more of 
the generating companies: “SEP is a joint venture controlled by its parent companies together.” 
104
  [1991] OJ L185/21. 
105
  ibid para 30. 
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members. In line with this approach the Commission held in Rubber Chemicals
106
 that 
a JV, Flexys, did not constitute a single entity with the two parents that jointly 
controlled it. On the contrary, it held that as the creation of the JV had been approved 
by the Commission under the EUMR, the parents had withdrawn from the JV’s 
market, neither parent had sole control over the JV and the JV could be presumed to 
be autonomous from its parents. Consequently, it “can be presumed to constitute a 
separate undertaking with respect to its parents”.107 
These decisions reflect a more cautious approach to the concept of an 
undertaking and a reluctance to accept that cooperation through a JV should 
automatically escape antitrust scrutiny under Article 101. Indeed, as a core objective 
of Article 101 is to allow the detection, condemnation and elimination of “naked” 
cartel activity,
108
 it seems important, in the context of JVs, to ensure that competitors 
are not able to manipulate business structures in a way which allows them to put 
unlawful coordination between them beyond the reach of the antitrust rules: entities 
should not be able to evade the rules on competition on account simply of the form in 
which they coordinate their conduct. To ensure that this principle is effective Article 
101(1) specifically covers “not only direct methods of coordinating conduct between 
undertakings (agreements and concerted practices) but also institutionalised forms of 
cooperation, that is to say, situations in which economic operators act through a 
collective structure or a common body.”109 The concept of an association of 
undertaking has therefore been interpreted broadly to encompass entities used as an 
institutionalized mechanism for coordinating the members/ shareholders’ conduct. It 
has been held to include trade associations, agricultural cooperatives, professional 
regulatory bodies, associations without legal personality, non-profit making 
associations and associations of associations, whether or not the entities have a legal 
 
106
  21 December 2005. 
107
  Ibid, para 263. 
108
  “An anticompetitive agreement, anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive 
arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output 
restrictions or quotas, or share of divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or 
lines of commerce” OECD, Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 
C(98)35/FINAL, May 1998. 
109
  Case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten [2002] ECR I-
1577, Léger AG, para 62, aff’d Case T-118/08, MasterCard v Commission, 24 May 2012, para 
243.  
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personality or a corporate form (a privately held stock company or a publicly listed 
company).
110
   





been regarded either as decisions of an association of undertakings or as agreements 
between the undertaking banks within the meaning of Article 101. In such 
circumstances the conduct of the “association of undertakings” is characterised as the 
joint conduct of the member/shareholders not as the unilateral conduct of a separate 
economic unit. Further, in “Joint selling of the media rights to the FA Premier 
League”,113 the Commission treated the arrangements put in place by the football 
clubs in the Premier League to sell media rights pertaining to Premier League 
Matches exclusively through the Football Association Premier League (“FAPL”)114 as 
joint conduct falling within the scope of Article 101(1). FAPL is “an association of 
undertakings, and action taken in relation to the media rights is therefore a decision by 
an association of undertakings.”115 The selling of the FAPL Company was thus 
analysed as “joint” selling which prevented the clubs from taking independent 
commercial action regarding the exploitation of the media rights and which could 
restrict output and create foreclosure problems on downstream markets. In none of 
these cases was the conduct treated as cartel behaviour automatically infringing the 
competition law provisions. Rather, the substantive antitrust scrutiny took account of 
 
110
  See eg Case 96/82, IAZ International Belgium NV v Commission [1989] ECR 2117; Case C-250/92 
Gøttrup-Klim [1994] ECR I-564; Case C-309/99, Wouters (n 109); UEFA [2003] OJ L291/25; EPI 
code of conduct [1999] OJ L106/14 MasterCard case, Europay (Eurocard-MasterCard), 19 
December 2007 (the Commission rejected MasterCard’s argument that its public listing on the 
New York Stock Exchange had changed the organisation’s governance so fundamentally that any 
decision of its board no longer qualified as a decision of an association but rather constituted a 
“unilateral” act which each member bank bilaterally agrees to abide by, aff’d MasterCard (n 109)). 
111
  Eg Visa International [2002] OJ L318/17. 
112
  E.g. MasterCard (n 109&110).  
113
  [2006] OJ C7/18. See also Deutsche Bundesliga [2005] OJ L134/46. 
114
  FAPL is a private limited company governed in accordance with its Articles of association and the 
Rules and Regulations adopted by it. The shareholders of the FAPL are the clubs which from 
season to season participate in the Premier League competition. The Rules and Regulation grant 
FAPL the exclusive right to negotiate media rights agreements on behalf of the clubs. It may not 
enter into broadcast contracts without the prior approval by resolution of the clubs in a general 
meeting. See also Case T-193/02 Piau v Commission[2005] ECRII-209, paras 69-72. 
115
  See Notice published pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 concerning case 
COMP/C.2/38.173 and 38.453 - joint selling of the media rights of the FA Premier League on an 
exclusive basis [2004] OJ C 115/02, para 3.  
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the context of the case and the broader objectives of the venture. Nonetheless, the 
characterisation of the conduct as joint conduct (rather than the unilateral conduct of a 
single entity) allowed the antitrust scrutiny under Article 101 to happen.
116
 
In these cases the Commission and Courts have been concerned with the 
question of whether, and if so how, Article 101 should be applied to the conduct of a 
JV or other venture/collaboration between actual or potential competitors on a market. 
The view could be taken that as they were adopted in this particular context, they 
provide greater weight and suggest a different approach to the concept of an 
undertaking than that adopted in the attribution of liability cases such as Dow. This 
view is also supported by the Commission’s approach to the term undertaking in the 
context of the EUMR. The Merger Regulation does not apply to internal restructuring 
within a group of companies but covers only operations resulting in the acquisition of 
sole or joint control by one undertaking over another.
117
 The Commission states in its 
Jurisdictional Guidance that the EUMR applies to changes in quality in control, 
including a change from joint control to sole control.
118
 If a jointly controlled JV 
constitutes a single undertaking, however, then if one of two parents exits the JV there 
is no acquisition of sole control by the remaining parent over another undertaking as 
the parent and JV constitute one and the same undertaking.  
An alternative view, however, could be that, that the concepts of an 
undertaking are the same in each line of cases but that in order to ensure that the 
workings and operation of a lawfully created JV is not hampered by meritless antitrust 
challenges (claiming, for example, that the JVs pricing decisions constitutes unlawful 
price fixing automatically violating Article 101
119
) the GC in cases such as Fuji and 
 
116
  Eg acceptance that FAPL and UEFA acted jointly on behalf of its members allowed the 
Commission to scrutinise both the horizontal and the vertical aspects of the joint selling. In the 
FAPL case, therefore, the Commission not only negotiated with the FAPL but with BSkyB to 
ensure that there were always two broadcasters of live premier league matches and that no one 
broadcaster could show all. See also Visa (n 111) and MasterCard (n 112). 
117
  Case IV/M.23, ICI/Tioxide, Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), paras 83–90. 
118
   “Decisive influence exercised alone is substantially different from decisive influence exercised 
jointly, since in the latter case the jointly controlling shareholders have to take into account the 
potentially different interests of the other party or parties involved”, Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), 
para 89.  
119
  See Werden (n 15) 705, (arguing that in the US lawful JV activity will otherwise be undermined by 
“meritless group boycott and price-fixing claims, which could erroneously be decided under the 
per se rule”). 
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Dow has carved out a specific exclusion from Article 101 for certain JVs
120
 - that is, 
those that: (1) are lawful at their inception (either under the EUMR, national 
competition rules or Article 101),
121
 (2) are judged lawful at the time the conduct is 
challenged;
122
 and (3) where the conduct at issue is within the scope or core activity of 
the JV.
123
 It has already been seen that this latter requirement appears essential in 
order to ensure that a swath of conduct which raises the antitrust dangers that Article 
101 is designed to police is not to be carved out from it and a range of potentially 
exclusionary and collusive behaviour allowed to go unchecked. 
3.  Other Factors which add to a lack of clarity 
a.  Terminology 
In a number of situations terminology is, or has been, used which confuses further the 
picture of what constitutes an undertaking. For example, in a number of earlier cases, 
the language adopted by the EU Courts appears to suggest that an economic unit is 
made up of “undertakings” and so is something distinct from the undertaking/persons 
of which it comprises.
124
 More frequently, however, the judgments have emphasized 
the more traditionally accepted view that “the concept of an undertaking … must be 
understood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic unit consists 
of several persons, natural or legal”.125 Those persons do not therefore themselves 
 
120
  Indeed, in Dow (n 82), para 99 the GC rejected the applicant’s argument that it was not possible to 
apply the concept of a single economic entity on the basis that the Commission had adopted a 
different approach in the past (the GC referred however only to Rubber Chemicals, concerned with 
attribution of liability, and not e.g., Gosmé/Martell, concerned with the application of Article 101). 
Dow had no legitimate expectation that the Commission would not vary its previous decision-
making practice. 
121
  As otherwise the creation of the JV would be unlawful and in certain circumstances void. 
122
  In the EU, a further concentration may occur if the parents enlarge the scope of a JV, see 
Jurisdictional Notice (n 51), paras 106-09. 
123
  See PE Areeda, Antitrust Law (Aspen Publishers 1986) 348 (“once a joint venture is judged to 
have been lawful at its inception and currently, its decisions should be regarded as those of a single 
entity rather than the parent’s daily conspiracy on every purchase-sale-hiring-licensing choice”). 
124
  See e.g., n 32, Viho (n 30), Lenz AG, Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Others v Zentrale 
zur Bekämpfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs [1989] ECR 803, para 35 (“Article [101] does not apply 
where the concerted practice in question is between undertakings belonging to a single group as 
parent company and subsidiary if those undertakings form an economic unit within which the 
subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action on the market"), Cases T-68, 
77&78/89 SIV and Others v Commission [1992] ECR II-1403, para 357 (Article 101(1) does not 
cover agreements or concerted practices between undertakings belonging to the same group if the 
undertakings form an economic unit). 
125
  Akzo Nobel (n 11), para 55 and CEES (n 24), para 40. 
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constitute undertakings but form part of the larger undertaking as a whole. In line with 
this latter view, the term “undertaking” in Regulation 1/2003, for instance, is 
interpreted as referring to the economic unit as a whole, allowing decisions to be 
addressed to legal entities which form part of the infringing undertaking (even if they 
were not directly involved in the infringement) and permitting fines to be imposed up 
to the statutory maximum of 10% of the total turnover in the preceding year of 
business of each economic unit involved in the infringement.
126
  
In other Regulations and Notices, however, a different approach is sometimes 
adopted. For example, the block exemption for vertical agreements and the 
Commission’s Notice on Agreements, apply to certain agreements between two or 
more undertakings. In each case, however, it is clarified that the term “undertaking” 
shall include the undertaking’s respective “connected undertakings”. Connected 
undertakings are defined to include, for example, “undertakings” in which a party to 
the agreement, directly or indirectly, has the power to exercise more than half the 
voting rights, or has the power to appoint more than half of the supervisory board, 
management or has the right to manage the undertaking’s affairs.127 Clearly these 
connected undertakings will, in most cases, be found to form part of the same 
economic unit/ undertaking as the party to the agreement. It does not seem correct, 
therefore, to use the terms “undertakings” or “connected undertakings” in this way. 
Although it is understood that definition is designed to provide legal certainty in the 
application of the respective Regulation/Notice, it is not entirely clear why a 
definition is required in this context but not in the context of Regulation 1/2003 and to 
what extent the definition can apply in so far as it differs from the definition of the 
term undertaking set out in the case-law of the EU courts. A similar approach is also 
taken in the context of the EUMR. Although when conducting its substantive 
assessment the Commission considers whether the merger between the merging 
undertakings/ economic units as a whole will significantly impede effective 
 
126
  Reg 1/2003 (n 37), art 23(2), Case T-112/05, Akzo Nobel (n 82), para 90 (‘[t]he maximum amount 
of 10% of turnover … must be calculated on the basis of the total turnover of all the companies 
constituting the single economic entity acting as an undertaking for the purposes of Article [101 
TFEU], since only the total turnover of the component companies can constitute an indication of 
the size and economic power of the undertaking in question …”.) 
127
  Reg 330/2010, art 1(2), see also the Commission’s Notice on agreements of minor importance (de 
minimis notice), point 12(2). 
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competition in the common market,
128
 the EUMR provides specifically that in 
calculating the turnover of the “undertakings concerned” for the purposes of 
determining Community dimension, the respective turnover shall be added together of 
the undertakings concerned and a number of entities including, for example, those 
undertakings in which the undertaking concerned, directly or indirectly either owns 
more than half the capital or business assets, or has the power to exercise more than 
half the voting rights etc.
129
 Again, although this need for legal certainty is 
understood, the use of the term undertaking in this context and the way it is defined 
causes confusion as it suggests an approach to the concept of undertaking which is not 
evidently consistent with the notion as defined by the EU Courts.  
b. Can an entity act jointly and unilaterally at the same time? 
A further conceptual difficulty, and a particular feature perhaps of Article 101 which 
applies both to undertakings and associations of undertakings, is that some case-law 
suggests that an entity can be found to be acting both jointly with its parents/members 
and unilaterally as a single undertaking at the same time. In Laurent Piau,
130
 for 
example, the GC held that although a sporting association constituted an association 
of undertakings it also constituted an undertaking in so far as it engaged in economic 
activity in a market itself. This reasoning is not easy, however. If the association is 
viewed as a single economic actor, the parents/members are viewed as part of that 
economic unit and not as separate undertakings. But if the parents are not 
undertakings; the sporting association cannot be an association of undertakings. 
Nonetheless, in FA Premier League v QC Leisure,
131
 an Article 101 challenge was 
launched before the UK courts to licensing agreements for premier league 
broadcasting rights concluded between FAPL and various national broadcasters. In 
 
128
  See e.g. Thomas (n 16), 12. 
129
  EUMR, art 5(4). With the aim of providing greater legal certainty in the application of the EUMR, 
this definition of control is different from, and more tightly defined than, the definition of control 
set out in Article 3(2) and described B.2.b above. Although the Commission invited comments as 
to whether the differences between the two meanings of control was problematic and whether it 
would be appropriate to harmonize the two provisions, no harmonization of the rules was in fact 
made, see 2001 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89, 
COM(2001) 745/6 final. 
130
  Case T-193/02, Piau v Commission [2005] ECR II-209, para 69. 
131
  [2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch), para 365. The same issue also arose in Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd [2008] EWHC 1666 (Admin), see Case C-429/08, Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd [2010] OJ C100/10. 
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spite of the Commission’s earlier characterisation of the FAPL as an association of 
undertakings, the FAPL was treated in these proceeding as an undertaking when 
considering whether the licensing agreement it had concluded with Greek 
broadcasters infringed Article 101(1). In the end, the characterisation may not have 
mattered as the CJ indicated, following an Article 267 reference to it, that exclusivity 
provisions incorporated within the licensing agreement, designed to prevent Greek 
broadcasters serving UK customers, violated Article 101.
132
 Had the FAPL decided to 
refuse to supply certain broadcasters, however, the distinction could have been 
material: it is difficult to establish that a unilateral refusal to deal by a dominant 
undertaking is unlawful. In contrast, a collective refusal to deal or boycott would be 
more likely to violate Article 101.  
D. THE NEED FOR A REFINED APPROACH?  
It has been seen that the interpretation of the notion of an undertaking as an economic 
unit has evolved in a series of cases arising in different contexts over a lengthy period 
of time. It has also been seen that, partly perhaps as a result of this piecemeal 
approach, it is not now easy to pull all of the strands of jurisprudence together and to 
reconcile the interpretation given to the concept of an undertaking in all cases, 
decisions, regulations and notices. It appears, therefore, to be an appropriate moment 
to take a step back and to look at the practice and approach to the term undertaking
133
 
in its totality and for a more holistic approach to be taken to the concept in the future. 
Indeed, the appeals pending before the CJ in the Dow and du Pont cases may provide 
the CJ with an opportunity to consider some of these matters.  
 A first issue which needs to be addressed is whether the notion of undertaking 
is in fact the same for both “substantive reach” and “attribution of liability” cases. It 
has been that the objectives underpinning the two strands of cases might suggest 
different models. In the most recent parental liability cases, for example, the EU 
Courts have upheld the Commission’s view that it appropriate to extend the concept 
of an undertaking to include parents and their JV where the parents control, the JV’s 
behaviour and are able to prevent violations by it. In so doing they have rejected 
arguments that attributing liability to parents in this way breaches fundamental 
 
132
  Case C-429/08, Murphy (n 131). 
133
  And possibly also to the term association of undertakings. 
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principles, such as the principle of personal responsibility. The breadth of these 
rulings is contentious and the principles set out in these cases are yet to be affirmed by 
the CJ. Further, these cases have not had to deal explicitly with the additional question 
of whether the entities are sufficiently closely linked that competition between them 
cannot be expected, so that their unity of purpose rules out the need to apply Article 
101 to agreements between them. Although early cases such as Hydrotherm and Viho 
might support the view that firms may form an economic unit where one has positive 
control over another and the power to decisively influence that other’s strategic 
behaviour, it would be interesting to have an EU Court specifically address the policy 
question of whether power to exercise negative control is sufficient to establish decisive 
influence in this context and, particularly, whether, and if so when, the conduct of a JV 
should be excluded from scrutiny under Article 101. 
 Although the logic behind adopting a context-specific approach is understood, 
a single concept of an undertaking, which applies throughout EU competition, would 
provide greater clarity and coherence to the system. Further, it appears to be approach 
supported by jurisprudence. If there is to be a single concept of an undertaking, 
further issues to be decided are whether some rationalization or refinement of the 
concept of undertaking/economic unit is required to make it consistent with the policy 
underlying it and whether the same general concept can be applied in slightly nuanced 
ways in the different contexts in which it is utilized. These questions may require 
consideration of a number of issues including, for example: whether or not the 
concept of control in undertaking cases should be aligned with the concept of control 
under the EUMR and/or whether, and if so when, the economic unit extends to 
relationships of negative control and JVs; whether the actual, or potential, exercise of 
control should be the seminal factor; and the relevance of the conduct engaged in by 
the entities. In considering any modifications, it should be ensured that the concept is 
defined with sufficient precision to allow firms, competition agencies and courts to 
determine with some certainty whether or not a group of entities constitute a single 
undertaking and that it is, in so far as is possible, reconcilable with all the 
jurisprudence in this area.  
 The clearest and perhaps simplest solution might at first sight appear to be to 
align the concept of “control” and “decisive influence” in undertaking and EUMR 
cases, accepting that if one firm has sufficient control over another that they should be 
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considered to have merged that they should thereafter be treated as a single 
undertaking. The discussion in this paper has established that the attribution of 
liability jurisprudence has come fairly close to accepting this proposition, placing 
increasing weight to the question of whether a parent has the power to exercise 
decisive influence over the behaviour of its subsidiary, accepting that joint control is 
sufficient to establish decisive influence and, for the first time (in Dow), relying on a 
finding of control for the purposes of an EUMR decision to reinforce a finding that 
sufficient control existed to uphold a single economic unit finding.  
A concern with such a solution, however, is that the extension of the concept 
of an undertaking so broadly, and especially to situations of negative and joint control, 
expands the concept considerably and perhaps beyond the objectives underpinning the 
notion. Further, such an approach might become excessively complicated and hard to 
administer. For example, in order to ensure that not too expansive a range of conduct, 
in particular, of a JV and its parents, is excluded from the ambit of Article 101(1), it 
has been emphasized that it would be essential to ensure that the economic unit only 
encompasses legitimately created JVs where the JV and/or parents are acting within 
its scope or core activities. If this is correct, then in JV cases the question of whether a 
JV and its parents form an economic unit will rest on the complex issues of whether 
the JV was legitimately created initially and whether the conduct at issue is inherent 
to the working and operation of the JV. Clearly, such an approach would be “fact-
intensive”, provide firms with “precious little predictability about their potential 
liability” and is likely to result in complex debate about what conduct can be said to 
be inherent to, or part of the core activity of, the JV.
134
 
 The better approach, therefore, may be to accept a narrower theory of an 
economic unit confining it to parent/ subsidiary relationships where the former has 
sole control over the latter and the power to control positively the subsidiary’s 
strategic behaviour on the market.
135
 Arguably, such an approach
136
 fits better with 
 
134
  Devlin and Jacobs (n 15), 12-13 (“The ‘core’ must, however, have a logical limit, since without 
one the concept of a ‘core activity’ would break loose from its moorings and encompass clearly 
unlawful conduct … Since the core-activity inquiry cannot be tethered to an identifiable, objective 
metric … we believe that a venture’s ‘core activity’ should not enjoy independent force as a 
substantive concept”). 
135
  Even if such an approach were adopted the Commission might still indirectly be able to hold 
parents responsible for the behaviour of an entity characterised as an association of undertakings. 
In particular, Reg 1/2203, art 23(2) (4) allows for fines to be imposed on an association of 
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the policy supporting the doctrine and is easier to reconcile with jurisprudence dealing 
with the application of Article 101 to the conduct of JVs, with associations of 
undertakings and with the Commission’s interpretation of the EUMR. Although such 
a proposal would bring the conduct of a legitimately created JV within the scope of 
Article 101, sight must not be lost of the fact that such conduct is simply subject to 
scrutiny under Article 101 – it is not necessarily prohibited by it. Clearly, Article 101 
should not nullify or prohibit the buying, pricing and other commercial decisions that 
are inherent to the operation of a legitimately created and lawful JV.
137
 Rather, the 
conduct of the JV is to be analysed in the legal and economic context in which it 
occurs, including the legitimate goals and objectives pursued by the JV.  
If such an approach were to be adopted, another issue to determined would be 
whether proof of power to exercise sole control should be sufficient or whether actual 
exercise of control or something further should be required. One solution would be to 
accept that the general rule should be that the power to control is sufficient, but that in 
attribution of liability cases actual control is required in order to ensure that the 
imposition of liability on a parent is compatible with fundamental principles such as 
personal responsibility, the presumption of innocence and limited liability. The EU 
authorities should not therefore pierce the corporate veil and impose liability on 
another entity within the economic unit unless it can be said to be at fault in some way 
and/or to have some responsibility for the infringing behaviour. Where the notion is to 
turn on the potential or power to exercise sole control then useful guidance on the 
issue could be derived from EUMR practice. In cases where actual exercise of control 
is required, however, further and more explicit guidance from the EU Courts would be 
helpful on the policy supporting the principle of parental liability,
138
 exactly what is 
 
undertakings and provides that where the infringement relates to the activities of its members the 
fine can amount to 10% of the sum of the total turnover of each member’s activity on the market 
affected by the infringement. Where this occurs and, if the association is not solvent, fines can be 
collected from members. 
136
  Confining it to situations where one person not accepting risk acts for or at the direction of another 
and is treated as integrated within that other or where one legal person’s market conduct/strategy 
can be positively controlled by a parent company 
137
  See L Ainsworth, ‘American Needle - Through European Eyes’ ABA Spring Meeting, March 
2011, 9 for the view that such activity is covered by the EUMR clearance (“such decisions and any 
agreement that gave rise to them with be treated as intrinsic to the establishment of the joint 
venture and so covered by the EUMR clearance”). 
138
  And why if it is legitimate to impose liability on a legal person that forms part of the economic unit 
it is not legitimate to impose liability on natural persons within it, see Thomas (n 16). 
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required to demonstrate actual exercise of control and whether, and if so when, a 
finding of actual exercise of control should be able to be based on inference deriving 
from the power to exercise control and the distinction between the two requirements. 
The case-law as it currently stands, indicating that actual decisive influence can 
sometimes be inferred from, for example, shareholdings or from the fact that a parent 
has not exercised its rights of co-determination, is not easy to reconcile and frequently 
comes perilously close to holding that potential exercise is sufficient (and 
consequently that liability of a parent with power to control is automatic).  
 Whatever solution is adopted, further clarification on the meaning of an 
economic unit from both the EU courts and the European Commission
139
 would be 
most welcome. Any further light which could be shed on the core concepts and the 
principles underpinning them would be helpful to ascertain the breadth of the 
principle and, ultimately, how the boundaries of an undertaking are to be identified.  
 
139
  The Commission might, e.g., consider the publication of a Notice on the meaning of an 
undertaking and an association of undertakings.  
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